The Structural Advantage of Democrats in Electoral Politics

Despite two consecutive victories by George W. Bush, Democrats retain a structural advantage in electoral politics. This has not always been so. In the five elections that took place in the 1970s and 1980s, the GOP won sweeping victories with over 400 electoral votes in four of them. That changed with the 1992 election. Since then, the nation has been largely split. Bill Clinton won two elections rather easily, with over 350 electoral votes each time, although he never managed to gain more than 49% of the vote. Then, George W. Bush won consecutive elections by much narrower electoral margins, though with a hefty popular vote win in 2004. In each of these four most recent elections, 34 states (plus the District of Columbia) have been carried by one party or the other every time. The Republicans have carried 15 states with a total of 135 electoral votes, while the Democrats have carried 19 states with a total of 248 electoral votes. This is a sizable advantage for the Democrats. You have to consider these 34 states the base of the electorate that is not likely to change for the 2008 election. Among the remaining 16 states, eight of them were carried in 3 of the 4 elections by one party, and are thus near-locks. The GOP carried five of these states worth a total of 64 votes, while the Dems carried three with a total of 16 votes. That brings the party base totals to roughly 199 for the GOP and 264 for the Dems.

That leaves just 8 toss up states remaining. Given the structural superiority of the Democrats, the GOP has to be nearly perfect in winning these states. These 8 states were each carried two times by Bill Clinton, then twice by George Bush, providing him his margin of victory. Those states are: Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Tennessee and West Virginia. Of these states, four should remain safe for the Republicans. Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia and Louisiana were all carried by double digit margins by Bush and are probably safe for the. This is probably also true of Arkansas, which Bush won by nearly 10%, but Clinton carried it two times and the electoral popularity of Hillary there is an unknown quantity. So, that leaves Missouri, Nevada, and Ohio to consider.

Bush won Missouri by a healthy 7.2%, but there was an anti-gay marriage amendment on the ballot that helped his turnout. In the statewide Senate election in 2006, Democrat Claire McCaskill defeated incumbent Jim Talent, but just barely. Her 2.2% victory in the middle of a national Democratic tide is not exceptional. Plus, her 48,000 vote winning margin would have been largely wiped out if, as many assume, most of the 47,000 votes that went to the Libertarian candidate would otherwise have gone to Talent. So, Missouri is a key state to watch. Was 2004 the fluke, with the anti-gay marriage amendment, or was 2006, with the anti-incumbent tide and the strong independent challenger, a perfect storm for the Democrats? In any case, this is a state where the GOP has to sink money to find out.

Nevada and Ohio are true purple states - each went twice for Clinton and twice for Bush. Each has one Dem and one Rep senator. Each was carried by Bush by a less than 3% margin. There is a general feeling that Ohio is lost to the Republicans for the time being. The state GOP has been hit by corruption scandals, and the Republican incumbent senator was defeated easily in a statewide election in 2006. Similarly, Nevada may be becoming less purple as well. It is a fast growing state, with many if not most of the new arrivals being natural Democratic constitutents, moving in from Democratic states. Though not as tough a test as Ohio, Nevada will be a struggle for Republicans in 2008.

Of the states categorized as near locks – those that have been carried by one party 3 of the last 4 elections, there are five that appear vulnerable for a switch in 2008. Colorado has been a largely Republican state, but Bush won by less than 5% in 2004, down from his nearly 8.5% win in 2000. Colorado is experiencing the same sort of demographic change as is Nevada, with many new voters moving in from California and other Democratic states.

Florida was the closest race in the nation in 2000, with Bush winning by just 500 odd votes. He increased his margin in 2004, but at just 5.01%, it remains vulnerable. Iowa had been a reliably Democratic state, going twice for Clinton and also for Gore in 2000, but Bush squeaked out a very narrow victory by just 0.67% of the vote. Similarly, New Mexico had gone for the Democrats in three consecutive elections until Bush won another narrow win by 0.79% in 2004. New Hampshire was won by Bush in 2000 after having gone twice for Clinton. Bush might have won it again in 2004 if his opponent had not been from neighboring Massachusetts. As it happens, Kerry took the state by just a 1.37% margin.

Four of these five states are “purple” in their senatorial representation, with one senator from each party. The fifth, New Hampshire, is currently represented by two Republican senators, but freshman John Sununu won his seat in 2002 by just 10,000 votes over former governar Jeanne Shaheen and faces a tough race in 2008 to retain his seat in a rematch. The Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee has already identified this race as one of their primary objectives in 2008, and that should boost Democratic turnout in the state. Three more of these five states will also be holding Senatorial elections in 2008. Iowa’s Tom Harkin faces a likely easy reelection bid, but the seats in Colorado and New Mexico (following popular Senator Pete Domenici’s recent announcement that he will not seek reelection) are open and will draw heavy national interest from both parties.

Among the 34 states that have gone solidly for one party over the last 4 elections, there are 5 potential candidates to watch as switches this time around. Curiously, they are all “Blue States.” The five, which all went to Kerry by margins less than 5%, are Oregon (4.16), Minnesota (3.48), Michigan (3.42), Pennsylvania (2.5) and Wisconsin - the closest race in the nation last time around with just a 0.38 margin - fewer than 12,000 votes - after Gore had carried the state by just a 0.22 margin.

Pennsylvania, although it was close in 04, can probably be scratched from the list. Statewide Republican candidates were decisively defeated in Pennslyvania in 2006. Oregon is probably too far out of reach for a campaign with limited funds. But, the three Great Lakes states of Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin are defintely in play for the GOP, especially if they name popular Minnesota governor Tim Pawlenty as their VP selection. Wisconsin has been the most closely contested state in the nation the last two cycles, Gore winning by a margin of just 0.22% and Kerry by just 0.38%. It is the most obvious target for the Republicans to try and switch a state from Blue to Red. Michigan is a stretch for the GOP, but might be in play if Mitt Romney wins the nomination – Romney was born in Michigan and maintains strong connections there, where his father was an executive in the automotive industry as well as governor of the state in the 1960s. Romney, former governor of Massachusetts, would also offer the party a decent chance to swing neighboring New Hampshire back into the GOP column.

Because they have more money and thus more freedom to be aggressive, the Democrats will probably also campaign hard in Virginia. Although Bush won in consecutive seasons by comfortable margins around 8%, and although Virginia has gone for the GOP candidate in 10 consecutive elections (and was even the only Southern State not to be carried by Jimmy Carter), some Dems see an opening in the state following Jim Webb's upset senatorial victory over incumbent George Allen in 2006. However, this might be fool's gold - Webb won a very tight election by less than 10,000 votes, just .39%. Still, with money to burn, this might be where the Democrats decide to spend it.

In summary, then, there are the 12 states that are crucial to any Republican chance of retaining the White House:
Missouri
Nevada
Ohio
Colorado
Florida
Iowa
New Hampshire
New Mexico
Minnesota
Michigan
Wisconsin
Virginia

As of now, I would predict that the Dems are going to pick up at least Nevada, Ohio, Colorado, Iowa, and New Mexico, for a net gain of 55 electoral votes over the 252* that Kerry won in 2004, bringing their total to 307, well above the needed 270 votes for victory. If this is the case, then the only chance for the GOP is to flip the 3 Great Lakes states and New Hampshire, which have a combined total of 40 Electoral votes, reducing the Dem gains to 17 and leaving them just short of the magic number 270. Even this would not be enough – it would result in a 269 to 269 tie, throwing the race to the House of Representatives where the Democrats will continue to hold their majority. The GOP will still have to win one of the other 8 states on the list to win the election. A strong chance for the Republicans to do so would be a ticket of Romney and Pawlenty. Their connections in the four crucial states would give the GOP a fighting chance – slim though it is - to maintain their hold on the White House. On the other hand, Giuliani’s stated intention to wage a 48 state battle (he cedes only Vermont and Massachusetts) – wasting limited funds on states where he has little or no chance - could doom the GOP to an electoral blowout, which would probably affect the important Senate and House races as well. If Giuliani thinks that electability is his trump card in the race for the GOP nomination, he needs to take a much more serious look at the electoral geography and make a case for himself in these Big 12 states.

*Kerry won states worth a total of 252 electoral votes, but he only is credited with 251 in tallies because one elector from Minnesota cast a vote for his running mate, John Edwards.

Of course its about the oil

In response to a couple of e-mails: Of course this war (these wars?) is about the oil. It is the only reason this region is drawing our strategic interest. If Russia was making a drive for a southern port, that, too, would make the region important. Absent either of those two facts, Southwest and Central Asia would be geopolitical backwaters.

I am not a politician, so I can say it out loud: The most important reason to be engaged in this region is because of the energy resources there. Everything else is a distant 2nd place. And 2nd place, as Blake (Alec Baldwin in Glengarry Glen Ross) would say, 2nd place is steak knives.

Leaving Iraq: Not When, But How?

The debate over Iraq in Congress is a momentous one for our nation and its future security. I fear, however, both sides of the aisle overlook or underplay a key point: It is not when we leave Iraq, but, rather, how we leave, that will matter most in the grand scheme. Over the past year, I have been conducting geographically based analyses of the War on Terror. To me, the outcome of the campaign in Iraq is secondary to how that outcome affects the overall situation in the region. We have constructed a nascent coalition in the region, our priority now must be to solidify it.

Iraq sits in the center of what Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Harkavy have termed the Strategic Energy Ellipse. Stretching from Russia at the northern end of the Caspian Sea to Oman at the southern terminus of the Persian Gulf, the SEE contains approximately 70% of the world’s proven crude oil reserves and about 40% of the worldwide supply of natural gas. Energy in general – and these energy resources in particular – make the global economy run. The top strategic priority for the United States (and the developed world as a whole) has to be the continued free flow of energy from this region. The United States cannot allow any single power or coalition of powers to dominate this region and threaten that flow.

An under-recognized achievement of the War on Terror has been the access agreements negotiated by the United States with the nations of Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa (CAMENA). This has not been a stated, programmatic goal of the Bush Administration, but history will likely recognize it as one of Bush 42’s great foreign policy successes. Today, the United States military has forces on the ground or basing and over flight agreements with nations in the heart of what was once the Soviet Union. The American strategic footprint has been extended to a degree unimaginable even a decade ago. As a byproduct of these agreements, Iran is now virtually surrounded by American military might. Even if Iran attains nuclear weapons, an Iran that is physically contained presents the West with many more options than one which is not. Further, as China and, especially, Russia, try to extend their influence in the region, this superstructure of containment can later be focused north and east, if necessary.

The immediate problem with this situation is that this ad hoc alliance is neither formalized nor time-tested. Already, the ties that would bind this proto-alliance are beginning to fray. Kyrgyzstan is nervous at the thought of a pre-emptive US attack on Iran and forbids the use of its key bases in such a move. The Turks are worried about an independent Kurdistan. The Saudis and Jordanians fear Iranian domination of a fractured Iraq. The United States government can help to curb these fears not only by talking to these friendly nations in the region but also by finally, as Dr. W. Andrew Terrill urges, by “treating allies as allies in the Arab world.” This is precisely what will not happen if Congress succeeds in forcing a quick withdrawal from Iraq.

This should not be read as another call to “stay the course” in Iraq. There are clear strategic advantages to an early US exit, if handled properly. On the other hand, there are other advantages to staying at least long enough to let the current “surge” take full effect. The point of this essay is that, whatever the United States does next, it must be done in full consultation with our new allies in the region. We will need them long after the Iraq campaign has ended. Although proposals such as the recently tabled Levin-Reed amendment do pay lip service to consultations with allies, its requirements on specific dates and targets would have made such “consultations” a sham. Artificial goals and timetables set by a Congress responding to partisan election strategies are a recipe for further disaster. Congressional unilateralism merely doubles down on the President’s own gambles.

Accidental Victory

In seeking to engage and defeat al Qaeda in September, 2001, the US military was confronted with a geographical problem. Al Qaeda’s leaders were entrenched in strongholds in the landlocked, mountainous nation of Afghanistan where they thought, with justification, that they were largely insulated from direct attacks by American military might. The keys to unlock the Afghanistan puzzle were found in the neighboring nations of Central Asia. Newly independent states that had suffered under Soviet domination for most of the previous century, these nations opened their airspaces and offered use of their bases to the United States, expanding the American strategic footprint in the region in ways unimaginable just a few years earlier. These new relationships have been essential to thwarting al Qaeda’s larger strategic goals and, if properly maintained in the coming years, will also prove essential to thwarting other strategic threats to US interests in the region.

The Strategic Energy Ellipse (SEE) is a region of extreme strategic importance to the United States. It stretches from the northern shore of the Caspian Sea to the southern terminus of the Persian Gulf. Within this region are found oil fields that hold approximately 70% of the world’s proven reserves of crude oil, and gas fields that hold about 40% of the global natural gas reserves. Any group, nation, or coalition of nations able to dominate this region would hold the keys to domination of a world economy dependent on these fuels. Strategically, the United States cannot allow such a domination to occur. This is what is at stake in the region, and all the concerns about Iraq and Afghanistan must take a back seat to this larger consideration.

Currently, there are three potential threats to domination of the SEE: (1) a pan-Islamic coalition of states that rise in a new Caliphate under the banner of al Qaeda, (2) a hegemonic Iran dominating the Persian Gulf and southern Caspian, and (3) a revived, imperialist Russia or a Russo-Sino coalition. It is my contention that the great foreign policy achievement of the Bush Administration will be remembered as the defeat of the first of these threats and the containment of the second, with the potential building blocks in place to confront the third.

In retrospect, the idea that Islamic world in total was going to flock to Osama Bin Laden as a new Caliph seems far fetched. However, on the afternoon of September 11, 2001, that idea had to be taken seriously. Nearly six years later, it is clear that possibility has been thoroughly defeated. Al Qaeda remains a genuine danger to US and Western citizens and interests, but it is no longer a serious threat to capture the region. Similarly, in orchestrating this strategic defeat of al Qaeda, the US has created a functional superstructure of containment around Iran. Although Iran can still attack at the gaps – through Hamas, Hezbollah, and allied militias in Iraq - they have no real strategic outlet and are, in fact, physically surrounded. The United States has military forces in or access agreements with every nation in physical contact with Iran. Indeed, many of those nations are more fearful of a resurgent Persian Empire than what they see ultimately as transient American interests. So, paradoxically, the stronger Iran gets, the tighter becomes the coalition against it. Now, the challenge for the remainder of the Bush Administration and for the next President will be to foster this currently informal superstructure into a formal alliance that can serve to permanently check any future Iranian drives for hegemony. As this alliance solidifies, it will also serve as a check against any Russian or Chinese drive to dominate the region. Russia and China apprehend this situation themselves, and are already trying to form a counter-alliance in the region. They have joined with several of the same Central Asian nations that are also working with the US in a structure called the Shanghai Cooperation Council. Thus far, the US has a slight edge in this competition for favor as the only one of the three great powers with military access to the countries, but that could change without great care being taken in preserving these relationships.

I titled this essay “Accidental Victory” because I do not believe the outcomes I have outlined above have been the results of a coherent, purposeful strategy pursued by the Bush Administration. Rather, it appears to have happened on an ad hoc basis, pursued primarily by military planners who needed bases from which to attack al Qaeda. Metaphorically, the ideological strategists of the Bush Administration have been playing checkers while the professional military men and women have been playing chess. Looking eight moves ahead like a grand chess master, we can see that, if we make all the proper moves, Iranian goals are already checkmated. Unfortunately, the Russians may already be eight moves beyond that. In the remaining months of the Bush Administration, and in the foreign policy of the next presidency, the game must be raised to one of three dimensional chess to match the over-the-horizon threat of a Russian play for domination of the region.

This article was originally published on July 29 in the Ft. Worth Star Telegram and the Contra Costa Times.

Welcome

The purpose of this blog is to comment on world events from the perspective of strategic geography. Although my focus will be on things that are necessarily political, my desire is to be as non-political as possible. That being said, I subscribe to the school of thought that believes that, although one should try to strike a balanced tone, one can never fully drop one's biases. It is better to open about those biases than to try and hide them. So, in the interests of full dislosure: I am a registered independent voter who tends to vote Republican in national elections and for the more conservative of the viable candidates in state and local elections. I am not a religious person, although I am not an atheist, and I don't consider myself to be a "right-winger," but rather somewhere on the center-right side of the mainstream. I tend towards personal conservatism and "small l" libertarianism. I am not an ideological conservative: I know the names Kirk, Strauss and Oakeshott, but I have never read them. I voted for George Bush twice, not because of any great affinity for the man, but only because I thought he was a clearly better choice than his opponents. Before that, I voted for Bill Clinton in 1996 and for Ross Perot in 1992.

In addition to being the title of this blog, strategic geography is a specialized niche within the broad field of geography. As I gear up to begin regular posting on this blog, I'll use the first few posts to give a general description of the field of geography, then narrow it down to specialty of strategic geography, so everyone will have a background to refer as we move forward.