In seeking to engage and defeat al Qaeda in September, 2001, the US military was confronted with a geographical problem. Al Qaeda’s leaders were entrenched in strongholds in the landlocked, mountainous nation of Afghanistan where they thought, with justification, that they were largely insulated from direct attacks by American military might. The keys to unlock the Afghanistan puzzle were found in the neighboring nations of Central Asia. Newly independent states that had suffered under Soviet domination for most of the previous century, these nations opened their airspaces and offered use of their bases to the United States, expanding the American strategic footprint in the region in ways unimaginable just a few years earlier. These new relationships have been essential to thwarting al Qaeda’s larger strategic goals and, if properly maintained in the coming years, will also prove essential to thwarting other strategic threats to US interests in the region.
The Strategic Energy Ellipse (SEE) is a region of extreme strategic importance to the United States. It stretches from the northern shore of the Caspian Sea to the southern terminus of the Persian Gulf. Within this region are found oil fields that hold approximately 70% of the world’s proven reserves of crude oil, and gas fields that hold about 40% of the global natural gas reserves. Any group, nation, or coalition of nations able to dominate this region would hold the keys to domination of a world economy dependent on these fuels. Strategically, the United States cannot allow such a domination to occur. This is what is at stake in the region, and all the concerns about Iraq and Afghanistan must take a back seat to this larger consideration.
Currently, there are three potential threats to domination of the SEE: (1) a pan-Islamic coalition of states that rise in a new Caliphate under the banner of al Qaeda, (2) a hegemonic Iran dominating the Persian Gulf and southern Caspian, and (3) a revived, imperialist Russia or a Russo-Sino coalition. It is my contention that the great foreign policy achievement of the Bush Administration will be remembered as the defeat of the first of these threats and the containment of the second, with the potential building blocks in place to confront the third.
In retrospect, the idea that Islamic world in total was going to flock to Osama Bin Laden as a new Caliph seems far fetched. However, on the afternoon of September 11, 2001, that idea had to be taken seriously. Nearly six years later, it is clear that possibility has been thoroughly defeated. Al Qaeda remains a genuine danger to US and Western citizens and interests, but it is no longer a serious threat to capture the region. Similarly, in orchestrating this strategic defeat of al Qaeda, the US has created a functional superstructure of containment around Iran. Although Iran can still attack at the gaps – through Hamas, Hezbollah, and allied militias in Iraq - they have no real strategic outlet and are, in fact, physically surrounded. The United States has military forces in or access agreements with every nation in physical contact with Iran. Indeed, many of those nations are more fearful of a resurgent Persian Empire than what they see ultimately as transient American interests. So, paradoxically, the stronger Iran gets, the tighter becomes the coalition against it. Now, the challenge for the remainder of the Bush Administration and for the next President will be to foster this currently informal superstructure into a formal alliance that can serve to permanently check any future Iranian drives for hegemony. As this alliance solidifies, it will also serve as a check against any Russian or Chinese drive to dominate the region. Russia and China apprehend this situation themselves, and are already trying to form a counter-alliance in the region. They have joined with several of the same Central Asian nations that are also working with the US in a structure called the Shanghai Cooperation Council. Thus far, the US has a slight edge in this competition for favor as the only one of the three great powers with military access to the countries, but that could change without great care being taken in preserving these relationships.
I titled this essay “Accidental Victory” because I do not believe the outcomes I have outlined above have been the results of a coherent, purposeful strategy pursued by the Bush Administration. Rather, it appears to have happened on an ad hoc basis, pursued primarily by military planners who needed bases from which to attack al Qaeda. Metaphorically, the ideological strategists of the Bush Administration have been playing checkers while the professional military men and women have been playing chess. Looking eight moves ahead like a grand chess master, we can see that, if we make all the proper moves, Iranian goals are already checkmated. Unfortunately, the Russians may already be eight moves beyond that. In the remaining months of the Bush Administration, and in the foreign policy of the next presidency, the game must be raised to one of three dimensional chess to match the over-the-horizon threat of a Russian play for domination of the region.
This article was originally published on July 29 in the Ft. Worth Star Telegram and the Contra Costa Times.
The Strategic Energy Ellipse (SEE) is a region of extreme strategic importance to the United States. It stretches from the northern shore of the Caspian Sea to the southern terminus of the Persian Gulf. Within this region are found oil fields that hold approximately 70% of the world’s proven reserves of crude oil, and gas fields that hold about 40% of the global natural gas reserves. Any group, nation, or coalition of nations able to dominate this region would hold the keys to domination of a world economy dependent on these fuels. Strategically, the United States cannot allow such a domination to occur. This is what is at stake in the region, and all the concerns about Iraq and Afghanistan must take a back seat to this larger consideration.
Currently, there are three potential threats to domination of the SEE: (1) a pan-Islamic coalition of states that rise in a new Caliphate under the banner of al Qaeda, (2) a hegemonic Iran dominating the Persian Gulf and southern Caspian, and (3) a revived, imperialist Russia or a Russo-Sino coalition. It is my contention that the great foreign policy achievement of the Bush Administration will be remembered as the defeat of the first of these threats and the containment of the second, with the potential building blocks in place to confront the third.
In retrospect, the idea that Islamic world in total was going to flock to Osama Bin Laden as a new Caliph seems far fetched. However, on the afternoon of September 11, 2001, that idea had to be taken seriously. Nearly six years later, it is clear that possibility has been thoroughly defeated. Al Qaeda remains a genuine danger to US and Western citizens and interests, but it is no longer a serious threat to capture the region. Similarly, in orchestrating this strategic defeat of al Qaeda, the US has created a functional superstructure of containment around Iran. Although Iran can still attack at the gaps – through Hamas, Hezbollah, and allied militias in Iraq - they have no real strategic outlet and are, in fact, physically surrounded. The United States has military forces in or access agreements with every nation in physical contact with Iran. Indeed, many of those nations are more fearful of a resurgent Persian Empire than what they see ultimately as transient American interests. So, paradoxically, the stronger Iran gets, the tighter becomes the coalition against it. Now, the challenge for the remainder of the Bush Administration and for the next President will be to foster this currently informal superstructure into a formal alliance that can serve to permanently check any future Iranian drives for hegemony. As this alliance solidifies, it will also serve as a check against any Russian or Chinese drive to dominate the region. Russia and China apprehend this situation themselves, and are already trying to form a counter-alliance in the region. They have joined with several of the same Central Asian nations that are also working with the US in a structure called the Shanghai Cooperation Council. Thus far, the US has a slight edge in this competition for favor as the only one of the three great powers with military access to the countries, but that could change without great care being taken in preserving these relationships.
I titled this essay “Accidental Victory” because I do not believe the outcomes I have outlined above have been the results of a coherent, purposeful strategy pursued by the Bush Administration. Rather, it appears to have happened on an ad hoc basis, pursued primarily by military planners who needed bases from which to attack al Qaeda. Metaphorically, the ideological strategists of the Bush Administration have been playing checkers while the professional military men and women have been playing chess. Looking eight moves ahead like a grand chess master, we can see that, if we make all the proper moves, Iranian goals are already checkmated. Unfortunately, the Russians may already be eight moves beyond that. In the remaining months of the Bush Administration, and in the foreign policy of the next presidency, the game must be raised to one of three dimensional chess to match the over-the-horizon threat of a Russian play for domination of the region.
This article was originally published on July 29 in the Ft. Worth Star Telegram and the Contra Costa Times.
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