Leaving Iraq: Not When, But How?

The debate over Iraq in Congress is a momentous one for our nation and its future security. I fear, however, both sides of the aisle overlook or underplay a key point: It is not when we leave Iraq, but, rather, how we leave, that will matter most in the grand scheme. Over the past year, I have been conducting geographically based analyses of the War on Terror. To me, the outcome of the campaign in Iraq is secondary to how that outcome affects the overall situation in the region. We have constructed a nascent coalition in the region, our priority now must be to solidify it.

Iraq sits in the center of what Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Harkavy have termed the Strategic Energy Ellipse. Stretching from Russia at the northern end of the Caspian Sea to Oman at the southern terminus of the Persian Gulf, the SEE contains approximately 70% of the world’s proven crude oil reserves and about 40% of the worldwide supply of natural gas. Energy in general – and these energy resources in particular – make the global economy run. The top strategic priority for the United States (and the developed world as a whole) has to be the continued free flow of energy from this region. The United States cannot allow any single power or coalition of powers to dominate this region and threaten that flow.

An under-recognized achievement of the War on Terror has been the access agreements negotiated by the United States with the nations of Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa (CAMENA). This has not been a stated, programmatic goal of the Bush Administration, but history will likely recognize it as one of Bush 42’s great foreign policy successes. Today, the United States military has forces on the ground or basing and over flight agreements with nations in the heart of what was once the Soviet Union. The American strategic footprint has been extended to a degree unimaginable even a decade ago. As a byproduct of these agreements, Iran is now virtually surrounded by American military might. Even if Iran attains nuclear weapons, an Iran that is physically contained presents the West with many more options than one which is not. Further, as China and, especially, Russia, try to extend their influence in the region, this superstructure of containment can later be focused north and east, if necessary.

The immediate problem with this situation is that this ad hoc alliance is neither formalized nor time-tested. Already, the ties that would bind this proto-alliance are beginning to fray. Kyrgyzstan is nervous at the thought of a pre-emptive US attack on Iran and forbids the use of its key bases in such a move. The Turks are worried about an independent Kurdistan. The Saudis and Jordanians fear Iranian domination of a fractured Iraq. The United States government can help to curb these fears not only by talking to these friendly nations in the region but also by finally, as Dr. W. Andrew Terrill urges, by “treating allies as allies in the Arab world.” This is precisely what will not happen if Congress succeeds in forcing a quick withdrawal from Iraq.

This should not be read as another call to “stay the course” in Iraq. There are clear strategic advantages to an early US exit, if handled properly. On the other hand, there are other advantages to staying at least long enough to let the current “surge” take full effect. The point of this essay is that, whatever the United States does next, it must be done in full consultation with our new allies in the region. We will need them long after the Iraq campaign has ended. Although proposals such as the recently tabled Levin-Reed amendment do pay lip service to consultations with allies, its requirements on specific dates and targets would have made such “consultations” a sham. Artificial goals and timetables set by a Congress responding to partisan election strategies are a recipe for further disaster. Congressional unilateralism merely doubles down on the President’s own gambles.

Accidental Victory

In seeking to engage and defeat al Qaeda in September, 2001, the US military was confronted with a geographical problem. Al Qaeda’s leaders were entrenched in strongholds in the landlocked, mountainous nation of Afghanistan where they thought, with justification, that they were largely insulated from direct attacks by American military might. The keys to unlock the Afghanistan puzzle were found in the neighboring nations of Central Asia. Newly independent states that had suffered under Soviet domination for most of the previous century, these nations opened their airspaces and offered use of their bases to the United States, expanding the American strategic footprint in the region in ways unimaginable just a few years earlier. These new relationships have been essential to thwarting al Qaeda’s larger strategic goals and, if properly maintained in the coming years, will also prove essential to thwarting other strategic threats to US interests in the region.

The Strategic Energy Ellipse (SEE) is a region of extreme strategic importance to the United States. It stretches from the northern shore of the Caspian Sea to the southern terminus of the Persian Gulf. Within this region are found oil fields that hold approximately 70% of the world’s proven reserves of crude oil, and gas fields that hold about 40% of the global natural gas reserves. Any group, nation, or coalition of nations able to dominate this region would hold the keys to domination of a world economy dependent on these fuels. Strategically, the United States cannot allow such a domination to occur. This is what is at stake in the region, and all the concerns about Iraq and Afghanistan must take a back seat to this larger consideration.

Currently, there are three potential threats to domination of the SEE: (1) a pan-Islamic coalition of states that rise in a new Caliphate under the banner of al Qaeda, (2) a hegemonic Iran dominating the Persian Gulf and southern Caspian, and (3) a revived, imperialist Russia or a Russo-Sino coalition. It is my contention that the great foreign policy achievement of the Bush Administration will be remembered as the defeat of the first of these threats and the containment of the second, with the potential building blocks in place to confront the third.

In retrospect, the idea that Islamic world in total was going to flock to Osama Bin Laden as a new Caliph seems far fetched. However, on the afternoon of September 11, 2001, that idea had to be taken seriously. Nearly six years later, it is clear that possibility has been thoroughly defeated. Al Qaeda remains a genuine danger to US and Western citizens and interests, but it is no longer a serious threat to capture the region. Similarly, in orchestrating this strategic defeat of al Qaeda, the US has created a functional superstructure of containment around Iran. Although Iran can still attack at the gaps – through Hamas, Hezbollah, and allied militias in Iraq - they have no real strategic outlet and are, in fact, physically surrounded. The United States has military forces in or access agreements with every nation in physical contact with Iran. Indeed, many of those nations are more fearful of a resurgent Persian Empire than what they see ultimately as transient American interests. So, paradoxically, the stronger Iran gets, the tighter becomes the coalition against it. Now, the challenge for the remainder of the Bush Administration and for the next President will be to foster this currently informal superstructure into a formal alliance that can serve to permanently check any future Iranian drives for hegemony. As this alliance solidifies, it will also serve as a check against any Russian or Chinese drive to dominate the region. Russia and China apprehend this situation themselves, and are already trying to form a counter-alliance in the region. They have joined with several of the same Central Asian nations that are also working with the US in a structure called the Shanghai Cooperation Council. Thus far, the US has a slight edge in this competition for favor as the only one of the three great powers with military access to the countries, but that could change without great care being taken in preserving these relationships.

I titled this essay “Accidental Victory” because I do not believe the outcomes I have outlined above have been the results of a coherent, purposeful strategy pursued by the Bush Administration. Rather, it appears to have happened on an ad hoc basis, pursued primarily by military planners who needed bases from which to attack al Qaeda. Metaphorically, the ideological strategists of the Bush Administration have been playing checkers while the professional military men and women have been playing chess. Looking eight moves ahead like a grand chess master, we can see that, if we make all the proper moves, Iranian goals are already checkmated. Unfortunately, the Russians may already be eight moves beyond that. In the remaining months of the Bush Administration, and in the foreign policy of the next presidency, the game must be raised to one of three dimensional chess to match the over-the-horizon threat of a Russian play for domination of the region.

This article was originally published on July 29 in the Ft. Worth Star Telegram and the Contra Costa Times.

Welcome

The purpose of this blog is to comment on world events from the perspective of strategic geography. Although my focus will be on things that are necessarily political, my desire is to be as non-political as possible. That being said, I subscribe to the school of thought that believes that, although one should try to strike a balanced tone, one can never fully drop one's biases. It is better to open about those biases than to try and hide them. So, in the interests of full dislosure: I am a registered independent voter who tends to vote Republican in national elections and for the more conservative of the viable candidates in state and local elections. I am not a religious person, although I am not an atheist, and I don't consider myself to be a "right-winger," but rather somewhere on the center-right side of the mainstream. I tend towards personal conservatism and "small l" libertarianism. I am not an ideological conservative: I know the names Kirk, Strauss and Oakeshott, but I have never read them. I voted for George Bush twice, not because of any great affinity for the man, but only because I thought he was a clearly better choice than his opponents. Before that, I voted for Bill Clinton in 1996 and for Ross Perot in 1992.

In addition to being the title of this blog, strategic geography is a specialized niche within the broad field of geography. As I gear up to begin regular posting on this blog, I'll use the first few posts to give a general description of the field of geography, then narrow it down to specialty of strategic geography, so everyone will have a background to refer as we move forward.